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Abstract
Whenever a logic is the set of theorems of some deductive system, where the latter
has an equivalence system, the behavioral theorems of the logic can be determined
by means of that equivalence system. In general, this original equivalence system
may be too restrictive, because it suffices to check behavioral theorems by means
of any admissible equivalence system (that is an equivalence system of the small-
est deductive system associated with the given logic). In this paper, we present a
range of examples, which show that: 1) there is an admissible equivalence system
which is not an equivalence system for the initial deductive system, 2) there is
a non-finitely equivalential deductive system with a finite admissible equivalence
system, and 3) there is a deductive system with an admissible equivalence sys-
tems, such that this deductive system is not even protoalgebraic itself. We use
methods and results from algebraic and modal logic.
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1. Introduction
Suppose we have a propositional language, i.e. a non-empty set of functional
symbols Λ and a countable infinite set of variables. A theory is simply some
set of well-defined formulas of this language, and a logic is a theory which
is closed under simultaneous substitutions. A behavioral theorem for a
logic L is a pair of formulas, that cannot be distinguished semantically,
by that we mean that they cannot be distinguished modulo logic L, when
substituted into the same arbitrary context. More formally, 〈α, β〉 is a
behavioral theorem for L iff for every Λ-term (context) t(x, z¯),
t(α, z¯) ∈ L ⇐⇒ t(β, z¯) ∈ L
—the set of all Λ-terms will be denoted henceforth by TΛ. Following the
tradition of abstract algebraic logic we denote the set of behavioral theo-
rems for L by ΩL. In algebraic specification of software systems, namely
in equational setting, behavioral theorems play an important role. Very
often, computer scientists are interested in developing automatic tools to
check if a given equation is a behavioral theorem (cf. [5] and [9]).
Generally, to determine that a pair 〈α, β〉 is a behavioral theorem for
L would require testing it in infinitely many contexts. In a particular case,
when L has a biimplication-like connective, say ↔, we have
〈α, β〉 ∈ ΩL iff (∀t ∈ TΛ : t(α, z¯) ∈ L ⇐⇒ t(β, z¯) ∈ L)
iff (∀t ∈ TΛ : t(α, z¯)↔ t(β, z¯) ∈ L)
In this case we call the set ∆(x, y, p¯) := {t(x, z¯)↔ t(y, z¯) | t ∈ TΛ} ⊆ FmΛ
a parameterized defining set for behavioral theorems of logic L, where all
zi from each vector z¯ are among the elements of the potentially infinite list
p¯ (p¯ in ∆(x, y, p¯) is a notational convention meant to show that contexts
depend on parameters).
If it is possible to eliminate parameters, then we have simply a defining
set, i.e., there is ∆(x, y) ⊆ FmΛ such that
〈α, β〉 ∈ ΩL iff ∆(α, β) ⊆ L.
Sometimes it is possible to further simplify a defining set, by reducing
it to a finite set of chosen contexts, such set is called a finite defining
set for behavioral theorems. Obviously, for practical purposes this is the
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most desirable condition. This is the case, for instance, for the classical
propositional logic CPL, where
〈α, β〉 ∈ Ω(CPL) ⇐⇒ α↔ β ∈ CPL,
therefore ∆(x, y) = {x↔ y}.
The notion of the defining set for behavioral theorems is related to
(but not coincides with) the notion of the equivalence system for a deduc-
tive system. Deductive systems are often considered in the same contexts
as logics. For instance, the classical propositional logic CPL is assumed to
be equipped with the modus ponens rule: α, α→ β/β, and is called in this
context the classical propositional calculus (CPC). Similarly, a particular
normal modal logic, say L, is considered to be equipped with a deductive
apparatus, which usually includes the rules of modus ponens and necessi-
tation α/α. Therefore it is sometimes beneficial to consider instead of
just the logic L the set of all theories, that extend L and are closed un-
der postulated inference rules. That leads to the notion of the abstract
deductive system, the qualification abstract relating to the fact, that so
presented deductive system does not require any explicit representation of
its deductive apparatus. An equivalence system for a deductive system S
plays essentially the same role for every theory T of S as a defining set
for a logic. For instance, for the deductive system K→ (all sets of modal
formulas extending K and closed under modus ponens) associated with the
modal logic K, we have for every theory T ∈ K→
〈α, β〉 ∈ ΩT ⇐⇒ {n(α↔ β)}n∈ω ⊆ T,
where 0α := α, n+1α := (nα). Thus ∆(x, y) := {n(α↔ β)}n∈ω is
an (infinite) equivalence system for the deductive system K→ [8, Theorem
II.4] and therefore can serve as a defining set for the behavioral theorems
of the logic K.
Also, in general, if a logic is a theory of an equivalential deductive
system, then its behavioral theorems can be determined by the use of the
inherent equivalence system. But the latter system is usually excessive, and
in fact the behavioral theorems can be checked by means of any admissible
equivalence system, which is an equivalence system of the deductive system
of admissible rules associated with the given logic (note that the inherent
equivalence system is also admissible).
For a quick illustration, let us consider logics Int, CPL and Triv over
the language Λ = {∨,∧,→,¬}, where Int is the intuitionistic logic and
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Triv is the set of all formulas in the language Λ. It is well known, that
Int→ has {x↔ y} as its equivalence system. The logic CPL is a theory of
Int→, therefore {x ↔ y} is a defining set for behavioral theorems of CPL
(so {x↔ y} is also an admissible equivalence system for CPC := CPL→).
There are no proper admissible equivalence systems for CPL→, because
CPL→ is structurally complete (so CPL→ is the smallest deductive system
containing CPL). The set Triv := FmΛ is a logic in our definition. It is
also a theory of Int→, therefore has {x ↔ y} as a defining system for its
behavioral theorems, but it also has the smaller set ∆ = ∅ as a defining
system (since every pair 〈α, β〉 is a behavioral theorem for Triv).
The question arises:
Given a deductive system, are there any proper admissible equivalence
systems for it?
(We will call such systems weak equivalence systems.) If so, in many
cases there will be possible, for the sake of determining of behavioral the-
orems, to replace the original equivalence system with a finer-tuned weak
one.
In general the answer for this question is “yes”, as shown for instance
in [8].
In this paper we extend on the results of [8] and study the problem
of existence of weak equivalence systems for deductive systems over modal
signatures. For that goal we review and present a list of some known results
about equivalential logics and add to that list several results of our own.
We show that even in the simplest case of the modal language, i.e., with
one unary modal operator and classical connectives, a variety of possible
situations arises, including the cases:
• there is an admissible equivalence system which is not an equivalence
system for the initial deductive system (Example 12),
• there is a non-finitely equivalential deductive system with a finite
admissible equivalence system (Example 13),
• there is a deductive system with an admissible equivalence system,
such that this deductive system is not even protoalgebraic itself (Ex-
ample 14).
These results indicate that in the case of yet more expressive languages,
there can be numerous ways for refining of implicit equivalence systems.
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2. Preliminaries and Notation
We use the terminology employed in the theory of non-classical logics.
A propositional language type is any non-empty set Λ. The elements
of Λ are called functional symbols in the algebraic context or logical con-
nectives in the logical context. With Λ we associate an arity function
ρ : Λ→ ω such that ρf is the arity of the connective f ∈ Λ. For each n ∈ ω:
Λn := {f ∈ Λ | ρf = n}. An algebra A of type Λ is a pair 〈A,ΛA〉, where
A is a non-empty set called the universe of A and ΛA = 〈fA | f ∈ Λ〉 is a
list of operations over the set A such that for every f ∈ Λn, fA : An → A.
Members of ΛA are called basic operations of A. If A, B are algebras of
the same type, then a mapping h : A → B is called a homomorphism of
A into B (written h : A → B), if for every f ∈ Λn and every 〈a¯〉 ∈ An,
hfA〈a¯〉 = fBh〈a¯〉. A homomorphism h : A → A is called an endomor-
phism of A; if h is also surjective and injective, then h is an automorphism
of A.
Let X be a non-empty set. The set FmΛX of formulas (or terms) of
type Λ over the set of variables (or generators) X is defined recursively as
follows
1. X ⊆ FmΛX,
2. if f ∈ Λn and α1, . . . , αn ∈ FmΛX, then 〈f, α1, . . . , αn〉 ∈ FmΛX.
Traditionally the formula 〈f, α1, . . . , αn〉 is written as f(α1, . . . , αn).
Formulas will be denoted usually by small Greek letters. We write α(x1, . . . ,
xn) or Var(α) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn}, if α ∈ FmΛ{x1, . . . , xn}. The vector 〈α1, . . . ,
αk〉 of Fm+L is called a sequent and will be written usually in the form
α1, . . . , αk−1 . αk.
We can induce the structure of an algebra on FmΛX by associating
with each f ∈ Λn an n-ary operation fFmΛX on the set FmΛX defined by
fFmΛX〈α¯〉 = f(α¯). The superscript in this case is usually omitted. This
algebra FmΛX is called the algebra of formulas (terms) of type Λ over the
set of variables X. We fix a countable infinite set Var = {x0, x1, x2, ...} of
propositional variables. Then FmΛVar is called the formula algebra over
the language of type Λ and will be denoted FmΛ. The universe of FmΛ is
denoted as FmΛ.
The algebra FmΛX is in fact an absolutely free algebra over the set X
in the class of all algebras of type Λ. This means that, for every algebra A
of type Λ, an arbitrary mapping h : X → A can be uniquely extended to
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a homomorphism h : FmΛX → A. In particular any homomorphism h :
FmΛX → A is determined by the mapping h : X → A. A homomorphism
h : FmΛ → A is called an evaluation (or valuation); a homomorphism
h : FmΛ→FmΛ is called a substitution.
A non-empty family C ⊆ P(A) (where P(A) is the powerset of A)
is upward-directed if for every pair X,Y ∈ C there is Z ∈ C such that
X,Y ⊆ Z. A subset C ⊆ P(A) is algebraic if ⋃D ∈ C for every non-
empty upward-directed subfamily D ⊆ C. A family C ⊆ P(A) is called a
closure system over A if
⋂D ∈ C for every subfamily D ⊆ C. In particular,⋂ ∅ := A ∈ C. A closure system C over FmΛ is (surjectively) invariant if
for any (surjective) substitution σ and any T ∈ C, σ−1T := {α | σα ∈
T} ∈ C, or, in other words, if σ−1C ⊆ C for all (surjective) substitutions
σ : FmΛ → FmΛ.
Every closure system C, as a family of subsets ordered under set-
inclusion, forms a complete lattice. The infimum of a family {Xi}i∈I ⊆ C
is its intersection
⋂
i∈I Xi, and its supremum is
∨C
i∈I Xi :=
⋂{T ∈ C |⋃
i∈I Xi ⊆ T}; its largest element is A, and its smallest element is
⋂ C.
A deductive system is a pair S = 〈FmΛ,ThS〉 such that ThS ⊆
P(FmΛ) is an algebraic invariant closure system over FmΛ. (Note that
some authors define the deductive system without the condition for ThS
being algebraic. They would call our deductive systems finitary). The
elements of ThS are called S-theories. For any deductive system S and
all T ∈ ThS, [T )ThS := {U ∈ ThS | T ⊆ U} denote a principal filter
of the lattice ThS generated by T . If S is a deductive system, we denote
ThmS := ⋂ThS—the set of theorems of S. If the language Λ is fixed we
identify S with ThS.
Given a deductive system S we define a relation `S⊆ P(FmΛ)×FmΛ,
between sets of formulas and individual formulas, in the following way
Γ `S α iff α ∈
⋂
{T ∈ ThS | Γ ⊆ T}.
The relation `S is called the consequence relation of S. When S is clear
from context we simply write `. This relation can be extended to the
relation between sets of formulas as follows:
Γ `S ∆ iff Γ `S α for every α ∈ ∆.
A rule r is a pair 〈Γ, α〉 (we write it as Γ ` α), where Γ ⊆ FmΛ and
α ∈ FmΛ.
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If Γ is finite, say Γ = {α1, . . . , αn}, the rule is called finitary ; in this
case a rule can be written as α1, . . . , αn ` α or α1, . . . , αn
α
.
Let Λ be a propositional language. A theory is any set of formulas
T ⊆ FmΛ. A logic L is any theory L ⊆ FmΛ such that it is closed under
substitutions, i.e., for all σ : FmΛ → FmΛ: σL ⊆ L. Note that for every
deductive system S, the set of theorems ThmS is always a logic.
A rule Γ ` α is compatible with the theory T ⊆ FmΛ if, for all substi-
tutions σ : FmΛ → FmΛ,
σΓ ⊆ T =⇒ σα ∈ T.
If a rule r is compatible with the theory T , then we say that T is closed
under r or that T is a theory of r. Every rule r defines a deductive system
〈FmΛ,Th(r)〉 of all theories of r. If a rule r is compatible with the logic
L, then we say that r is admissible for the logic L. We denote AdmL the
set of all finitary admissible rules for L. Let Lad be the finitary deductive
system of all theories that are closed under all finitary rules admissible for
L. For a deductive system S, denote
Sad := (ThmS)ad.
It is easy to see that
Lemma 1. Lad is the smallest deductive system (i.e., it has the smallest
set of theories), such that
{σ−1L | σ : FmΛ → FmΛ} ⊆ Lad.
3. Weak Equivalence Systems
Definition 2. Let S be a deductive system. A pair of formulas 〈α, β〉 is
a behavioral theorem for a theory T ∈ ThS iff for every term t(x, z¯)
t(α, z¯) ∈ T ⇐⇒ t(β, z¯) ∈ T.
The set of all behavioral theorems for a theory T forms a congruence,
known in algebraic logic as the Leibniz congruence for T , notationally ΩT .
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Definition 3. A set of formulas ∆(x, y) ⊆ FmΛ{x, y} is an equivalence
system for a deductive system S if the following hold
1. `S ∆(x, x); (EQ1)
2. x,∆(x, y) `S y; (EQ2)
3. ∆(x, y) `S ∆(y, x); (EQ3)
4. ∆(x, y),∆(y, z) `S ∆(x, z); (EQ4)
5. 〈∆(xi, yi)〉i∈n `S ∆(o〈xi〉i∈n, o〈xi〉i∈n) for each o ∈ Λn. (EQ5)
In such case we also say that S is ∆-equivalential. A deductive system S
is equivalential if it is ∆-equivalential for some set of formulas ∆. If, in
addition, ∆ can be chosen finite, then S is called finitely equivalential.
If for a deductive system S there is a finite set of formulas ∆(x, y) such
that only EQ1 and EQ2 hold, then S is called protoalgebraic and ∆ is called
a protoequivalence system for S. Protoalgebraic deductive systems is the
most basic type of deductive system for which some weak algebraizability
phenomenon occurs (cf. [1]).
Note that every EQ1–5 represents the condition that every theory of S
is closed under every rule in the respective collection of rules. For example,
EQ3 means that every S-theory is closed under all rules of the kind
∆(x, y) ` α(y, x), where α(x, y) ∈ ∆(x, y).
It is well known that an equivalence system defines the Leibniz congru-
ence for every theory T . This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. ([3]) Let S be a deductive system and ∆(x, y) be an equivalence
system for S. Then for every T ∈ ThS
ΩT = {〈α, β〉 | ∆(α, β) ⊆ T}.
Definition 5. A set of formulas is called an admissible equivalence system
for the deductive system S if it is an equivalence system for Sad.
Note that every equivalence system for a deductive system S is also an
admissible equivalence system for S, but not every admissible equivalence
system for S is an equivalence system for S. This distinction is captured
in the following definition
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Definition 6. We say that an admissible equivalence system ∆ for a
deductive system S is weak, if
1. Sad is ∆-equivalential,
2. S is not ∆-equivalential.
4. Theories of admissible rules
Consider the following closure operators on families of sets. Let C ⊆ P(A),
then
• X C := {intersections of arbitrary subfamilies of C},
• Uˆ C := {unions of upward-directed subfamilies of C}.
If, in addition, C is a family of theories, i.e., C ⊆ P(FmΛ), then let
• Σ−1C := {σ−1T | σ : FmΛ → FmΛ, T ∈ C}.
Note that if C ⊆ P(A), then A ∈ XC, C ⊆ XC, C ⊆ UˆC.
We can provide now a simple characterization for Lad.
Theorem 7. Let L be a logic. Then
Lad = UˆXΣ−1L.
Proof. Since the operators X, Uˆ and Σ−1 preserve compatibility with the
finitary rules, the family of theories UˆXΣ−1L ⊆ Lad. Therefore it suffices
to show that UˆC is closed under intersections and inverse substitutions,
whenever C is an invariant closure system over FmΛ. Indeed, the latter
would mean that UˆXΣ−1L is a deductive system. Since Σ−1L ⊆ UˆXΣ−1L,
then Lad ⊆ UˆXΣ−1L, by Lemma 1.
Suppose we have a set {Ci | i ∈ I} of upward-directed families Ci =
{Tj}j∈Ji , i ∈ I, where all Ji, i ∈ I can be chosen so that Ji ∩ Jj = ∅, if
i 6= j. Suppose Si =
⋃
j∈Ji{Tj}. We want to show that
⋂
i∈I Si ∈ UˆC. We
have ⋂
i∈I
Si =
⋂
i∈I
⋃
j∈Ji
Tj =
⋃
a∈∏i∈I Ji
⋂
i∈I
Ta(i).
Let Ta :=
⋂
i∈I Ta(i), for every a ∈
∏
i∈I Ji. Let us show that the family
{Ta | a ∈
∏
i∈I Ji} is upward-directed. Take Ta and Tb. For every i ∈ I,
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Ta(i), Tb(i) belong to the upward-directed set Ci. Therefore, there exist
c ∈∏i∈I Ji, such that Ta(i) ∪ Tb(i) ⊆ Tc(i) ∈ Ci. Then
Ta ∪ Tb =
(⋂
i∈I Ta(i)
)⋃ (⋂
i∈I Ta(i)
) ⊆ ⋂
i∈I
(
Ta(i)
⋃
Tb(i)
) ⊆ ⋂
i∈I
Tc(i) = Tc.
For proving invariance, let S ∈ UˆC, i.e., S = ⋃i∈I{Ti}, for an upward-
directed family {Ti}i∈I ⊆ C. Then
σ−1S = σ−1(
⋃
i∈I Ti) =
⋃
i∈I σ
−1Ti.
But {σ−1Ti}i∈I is upward-directed, whenever {Ti}i∈I is:
Ti ∪ Tj ⊆ Tk =⇒ σ−1Ti ∪ σ−1Tj = σ−1(Ti ∪ Tj) ⊆ σ−1Tk,
hence σ−1S ∈ UˆC. 
Definition 8. Let L be a logic. We say that the set ΩL of behavioral
theorems of L is explicitly defined in L iff there is a set of formulas ∆(x, y)
in two variables such that
〈α, β〉 ∈ ΩL ⇐⇒ ∆(α, β) ⊆ L.
The set ∆ is called a defining set for behavioral theorems of L.
The importance of the admissible equivalence systems for Lad is shown
by the following lemma
Proposition 9. Let L be a logic and ∆(x, y) a finite subset of FmΛ{x, y}.
Then ∆(x, y) is a defining set for behavioral theorems of L iff ∆(x, y) is an
equivalence system for Lad.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose ∆(x, y) explicitly defines the behavioral theorems
of L. It is straightforward to show that L is closed under the rules EQ1–5.
For illustration, we will prove condition EQ3.
Let σ be a substitution. Suppose that σ(∆(x, y)) = ∆(σ(x), σ(y)) ⊆ L.
By hypothesis,
∆(σ(x), σ(y)) ⊆ L ⇔ 〈σ(x), σ(y)〉 ∈ ΩL
⇔ 〈σ(y), σ(x)〉 ∈ ΩL
⇔ ∆(σ(y), σ(x)) ⊆ L
⇔ σ(∆(y, x)) ⊆ L
Moreover, every T ∈ Σ−1L is closed under the rules EQ1–5. As above,
we only show for EQ3. Let T ∈ Σ−1L. That is, T = τ−1L for some
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substitution τ . Let σ be another substitution. Suppose that σ(∆(x, y)) ⊆
τ−1L. Hence, τ(σ(∆(x, y))) = ∆(τ(σ(x)), τ(σ(y))) ⊆ τ(τ−1L) ⊆ L. By
previous result, τ(σ(∆(y, x))) ⊆ L. Therefore,
σ(∆(y, x)) ⊆ τ−1(τ(σ(∆(y, x)))) ⊆ τ−1L
Since operators Uˆ and X preserve compatibility with finitary rules, it
follows from Theorem 7, that every theory of Lad is closed under the rules
EQ1–5.
(⇐) Suppose ∆ is an equivalence system for Lad. It follows from
Lemma 4, that ∆ explicitly defines, in the sense of Lemma 4, ΩT for any
theory T of Lad. In particular, ∆ explicitly defines behavioral theorems
of L. 
Lemma 10. If ∆ is a finite equivalence system for a deductive system S,
then ∆ is a finite equivalence system for Sad.
Proof. By Definition 3, every theory of S is a theory of rules EQ1–5. It
follows from Lemma 1 that Sad ⊆ S. Therefore all theories of Sad are also
theories for the rules EQ1–5, and ∆ is an equivalence system for Sad. 
We will construct our examples based on the following result
Lemma 11. ∆ is a finite weak equivalence system for a deductive system
S iff there is a deductive system Q ⊆ S such that
1. Sad ⊆ Q ⊆ S,
2. ∆ is a finite equivalence system for Q,
3. ∆ is not an equivalence system for S.
Proof. (⇒) If ∆ is a finite weak equivalence system then it is an equiv-
alence system for Sad, and Sad satisfies all the necessary conditions.
(⇐) Since Sad ⊆ Q, then Sad is ∆-equivalential. Therefore S has ∆ as
an admissible equivalence system, but not as an equivalence system. 
5. Examples
In this section we will provide some examples from the area of modal propo-
sitional logics that will support the claims we made in the introduction.
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Let Λ = {∨2,∧2,→2,¬1,1} be the modal propositional language
(where functional symbols are shown with arities) and
(MP) x, x→ y ` y modus ponens
(RE) x↔ y ` x↔ y extensionality rule
(NR) x ` x necessitation rule.
By a modal logic L we understand an invariant set L ( FmΛ of modal
formulas containing all classical tautologies and closed under MP. A modal
logic L is called classical if L is closed under RE. We will need the following
modal logics
• E is the least classical modal logic,
• K is the least modal logic containing the formula (x→ y)→ (x→
y) and closed under NR.
A modal logic is called normal if it contains K and is closed under NR.
• T is the least normal modal logic containing K and the formula x→
x,
• K4 is the least normal modal logic containing K and the formula
x→ x,
• S4 is the least normal modal logic containing both the logic K4 and
T .
Note that some of the deductive systems we will consider next are well
known in the theory of modal logics (under various names). For instance,
the weak consequence relation Lw (or L→ as in Introduction and in [8])
corresponds to [L)MP in our current notation (recall that [L)MP = {T ∈
Th(MP) | L ⊆ T}) and the strong consequence relation Ls (denoted also
L→,) corresponds to [L)MP+NR.
Example 12. ([8]) There exists a non-equivalential deductive system with
a finite weak equivalence system.
Proof. The deductive system [E)MP is not equivalential [8, Corollary
II.3], but [E)MP+RE is finitely equivalential with the equivalence system
∆ = {x↔ y} (see the remark after [8, Corollary II.3]).
Note that instead of [E)MP+RE, we can take ([E)MP)
ad, since
([E)MP)
ad ⊆ [E)MP+RE. 
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Example 13. There exists a non-finitely equivalential deductive system
with a finite weak equivalence system.
Proof. While [K)MP does not have a finite equivalential system [8, Corol-
lary III.2], it has an infinite equivalence system [8, Theorem II.4]
∆ω(x, y) = {n(x↔ y)}n∈ω.
It is easy to see that [K)MP+NR is finitely equivalential with
∆(x, y) = {x↔ y}
as it equivalence system. Indeed, for every theory T of [K)MP+NR, by
application of the rule NR,
∆ω(α, β) ⊆ T ⇐⇒ ∆(α, β) ⊆ T.
Thus [K)MP is a non-finitely equivalential deductive system that has a
finite weak equivalence system.
Analogous to Example 12, we can take ([K)MP)
ad instead of [K)MP+RE.
Similar to the above, but using [8, Theorem III.1], instead of [8, Corol-
lary III.2], we can show that the deductive system [T )MP based on Feys-von
Wright’s logic T is also a non-finitely equivalential deductive system with
a finite weak equivalence system.
By a structurally complete normal modal logic we understand a normal
modal logic L such that Lad = [L)MP+NR. (In other words, all admissible
rules of L are derivable using MP, NR and usual structural rules.)
Example 14. There exists a non-protoalgebraic deductive system with a
finite weak equivalence system.
Proof. Let L be any structurally complete normal modal logic extending
K4 (such logics exist, cf. [4]). By definition of structural completeness
Lad = [L)MP+NR.
Let L∅ be the deductive system of all sets of modal formulas that
extend L:
L∅ := [L)P(FmΛ).
Note that the theories of L∅ are not necessarily closed under modus ponens.
Then L∅ is strictly bigger than L→ := [L)MP. Indeed, consider the theory
T := L ∪ {(x → x) → y} ∈ L∅. Then x → x ∈ L ⊆ T , but y /∈ L (since
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L 6= FmΛ) and therefore y /∈ T . Thus T is not closed under modus ponens,
therefore T ∈ L∅, but T /∈ L→.
Under the assumptions that K4 ⊆ L, Lad = [L)MP+NR is equivalential
with the parameter-free equivalence system ∆(x, y) = {x↔ y}.
On the other hand, for any set of formulas ∆(x, y) ⊆ L, the theory
T := L ∪ ∆(x, y) ∪ {x} ∈ L∅ shows that ∆ cannot be a protoequivalence
system for L∅, since otherwise y ∈ L ∪ ∆(x, y), by EQ2. Thus if y ∈ L,
then L = FmΛ. If y ∈ ∆(x, y), then x ∈ ∆(x, x) ⊆ L, by EQ1, and again
L = FmΛ, but a modal logic, by definition, cannot be totally inconsistent.

An immediate question arises:
Suppose we have an equivalential system ∆ for a deductive system S.
Is it true that every weak equivalence system ∆′ for S can be obtained as a
subset of ∆?
Although it is true for all our examples, the answer in general is no.
Instead of equality, we have that every weak equivalence system ∆′ is equiv-
alent to some ∆′′ ⊆ ∆ modulo Sad. For the case of infinitely equivalential
deductive systems the answer follows from known properties of equivalen-
tial systems (cf. [3, Notes 3.1.7]).
Lemma 15. Suppose a deductive system S is equivalential with an infinite
equivalence system ∆. For every finite weak equivalence system ∆′ for S,
there is a finite ∆′′ ⊆ ∆, which is equivalent to ∆′ modulo Sad.
Proof. By [3, Notes 3.1.7(1)], every two equivalence systems are de-
ductively equivalent. Therefore, since ∆ and ∆′ are equivalence systems
for Sad (∆ is by inheritance from S) and Sad is finitary, ∆′ is deductively
equivalent to a finite sunset ∆′′ of ∆, therefore ∆′′ is an equivalence system
for Sad, by [3, Notes 3.1.7(2)]. 
6. Discussion
Admissible theories have been thoroughly investigated in the field of non-
classical logics by algebraic methods (cf. [12]). The key to the admissibility
theory of a logic L is the family Σ−1L of its inverse images under substi-
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tutions. For modal and superintuitionistic logics the problem of describing
admissible theories is traditionally reduced to description of pertinent fil-
ters of free algebras of finite rank Fn(λ) := Fn(var(λ)), n ∈ ω of the
corresponding variety of algebras var(λ) (cf. [12]). More direct but also
less developed approach would be to start with the free algebra Fω(λ) and
to consider the quasiequational theory of Fω(λ). This theory is determined
by a family of corresponding congruences on Fω(λ). But Fω(λ) is a homo-
morphic image of the absolutely free algebra of countable rank FmΛ (the
formulae algebra), under the canonical homomorphism which sends propo-
sitional variables to generators. Therefore we can pull the congruences back
along this homomorphism to obtain a family of congruences on FmΛ. The
last step for obtaining a Hilbert-style deductive system is to take for every
congruence the congruence class containing the constant term > := x→ x.
For illustration, let us look at the case of the admissible theories of Int,
i.e., of intuitionistic propositional logic Int with modus ponens as its only
inference rule. Intad does not have a finite basis for inference rules [11]
(but it is recursively axiomatizable by so called de Jongh-Visser rules [7]).
It is known that Int is not structurally complete [6], i.e., Intad is a proper
subsystem of Int→. Int→, in its turn, is finitely axiomatizable by axioms
of Int and modus ponens, it is also {x↔ y}-equivalential (even {x↔ y}-
algebraizable). It is not known whether Intad has an equivalence system
not interderivably equivalent to {x↔ y} modulo Intad.
In the realm of modal logics, there are three major deductive systems
usually associated with S4: S4ad ( S4→, ( S4→. Similarly to its in-
tuitionistic counterpart, S4ad does not have a finite basis for inference
rules [11], but it is recursively axiomatizable [10], while S4→, and S4→
are finitely axiomatizable. S4→ is {(x ↔ y)}-equivalential and S4→,
is {(x ↔ y)}-algebraizable. It is not known whether S4→, has a weak
equivalence system.
7. Conclusions and Open Problems
In this paper we studied the notion of weak equivalence system for a deduc-
tive system which expands a similar notion used in modal logics [8]. Each
weak equivalence system for S is an equivalence system for the admissible
part Sad of S. So admissible theories are crucial for characterizing weak
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equivalence systems. We outlined the basic properties of admissible the-
ories and showed some connections with the notions of abstract algebraic
logic. This is just preliminary work, in the sense that our proposal will
require more relevant outcomes, but the approach seems to be powerful.
The results and applications obtained are promising. We hope to carry on
a consistent algebraic theory of admissible equivalence systems in the near
future that we will report in forthcoming papers.
We finish by summing up here the list of open problems that seem to
be important for the topic.
• Is it true that every algebraizable deductive system does not have a
weak equivalential system?
• For the other direction: Is it true that an equivalential deductive
system with no weak equivalence system must be algebraizable?
• The deductive systems of the kind Sad are really important for de-
scription of admissible rules and solving logical equations. What is
the structure of Sad, at least for classical deductive systems?
• Is there a weak equivalence system for Int→? S4→,?
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